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What’s the Use of Marriage? 
 
We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and 
without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial 
property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the 
choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal 
discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a 
commitment device which facilitates cooperation. 
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 1 Introduction
Until only a few decades ago, the answer to the title question was
straightforward: people marry because cohabitation without marriage
attracts social stigma and legal discrimination. In the light of evi-
dence that stigma and legal discrimination have disappeared in devel-
oped countries, however, the question should rather be: why do cou-
ples still marry? In what follows, we use elementary game-theoretical
concepts to compare domestic equilibria in the presence and in the ab-
sence of the marriage institution. In particular, we examine the e⁄ects
of divorce legislation and sentencing practice, and of the matrimonial
property regime, on the choice of game conditional on marriage, and on
the decision to marry.
In much of the game-theoretical literature on the family, the nature of
the game is taken as given. In the wake of Manser and Brown (1980), and
McElroy and Horney (1981), most of the contributions assume that it
will be cooperative. A notable exception is Lundberg and Pollak (1994),
where the assumption is that the partners will behave non-cooperatively.
The choice of game is endogenous in Del Boca and Flinn (2005), but is
taken to depend on the exogenously given transactions-cost of coopera-
tion. We investigate whether, or in which circumstances, marriage can
be seen as a cooperation-inducing commitment device.
The idea that legislation may a⁄ect marital equilibrium is not new.
Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979), and Cigno (1991), address the issue
from a theoretical point view. The e⁄ects of divorce and property leg-
islation on marriage, divorce and married women￿ s labour supply have
been investigated empirically by a number of authors, but the theo-
retical analysis does not appear to have gone very far. Section 2 of
the present paper sets out the assumptions. Section 3 characterizes an
e¢ cient allocation of domestic resources. Section 4 characterizes the do-
mestic equilibrium in the absence of the marriage institution. Section 5
does the same in the presence of the marriage institution under di⁄er-
ent property regimes, and with di⁄erent divorce legislations and court
practices. Section 6 discusses the results in the light of the evidence.
2 Assumptions
We focus on the union formed by a particular woman, f, and a particular
man, m. The purpose of the union is to produce local public goods, in
particular children, and to reap the e¢ ciency gains that may result from
domestic division of labour. We assume that the parties are perfectly
informed about each other￿ s characteristics, and about the characteris-
tics of all alternative partners. This overlooks some important features
2of reality, but allows us to focus on e¢ ciency and distributional issues.
We also assume that the parties are free to lend at the going interest
rate, but allow for the possibility that borrowing may be subject to a
ceiling.
There are two decision dates, 1 and 2. At date 1, f and m decide how
much to work and consume, how many children to have, and how much
time and money to spend on each child. These decisions are irreversible.
At date 2, the children are independent adults, and the parents decide
how much to work and consume. This location of the decision dates on
the time line is not the only possible one, but is the most appropriate
for our purposes. Had we been concerned with the e⁄ects of custodial
arrangements on the amount of support provided by the non-custodial
parent for example, we would have placed date 2 somewhat earlier, when
the children are still dependent on their parents (but this, as we will
argue, would imply imperfect information). Had we been concerned with
the matching process, and with the way this is in￿ uenced by previous
investments in human capital and conventional assets, we would have
placed date 1 before, and date 2 at, the moment of the match. All
decisions may be taken either cooperatively or non cooperatively. In the
absence of cooperation, the number of children will be decided by the
woman. Cooperation may result in explicit or implicit transfers between
the parties.
Each party has the option of withdrawing from the union or, if the
couple is legally married, seeking a divorce. In real life, many unions
break down when the children are still dependent on their parents, or
even before the children are born. The cause of these early separations is
imperfect information about the present partner, or about the availabil-
ity of alternative ones. In our perfect information framework, however,
separation at date 1 makes no sense. Had either party had a better al-
ternative, he or she would have taken it in the ￿rst instance. Separation
may then make sense only at date 2, when the children are out of the
way, and there are then no more e¢ ciency gains to be had.
As in Cigno (1991), we assume that a child requires at least t0 units
of speci￿cally maternal time (but nothing of great substance is lost if
we set this minimum equal to zero). Together with the fact that men
cannot have children, this is the only "natural" gender asymmetry to
which we will admit ￿any other will be man-made. Above t0, the fa-
ther￿ s time is a substitute for the mother￿ s. In most of the analysis, we
will further assume that it is a perfect substitute. That is a convenient
simpli￿cation, which will permit us to derive analytical results in a fairly
straightforward manner, but we will argue in the next section that noth-
ing of substance changes if we assume that substitution takes place at a
3diminishing marginal rate.
Let c denote the amount of money or goods, and t the amount of
time ("attention") over and above t0, that a child receives from his or
her parents at date 1. For the perfect-substitutability assumption,
t = tf + tm; (1)
where ti is the amount of attention a child receives from i, i = f;m.
Plausibly assuming that the length of time for which the mother is in-
dispensable is relatively short,1
t0 < t:
The child￿ s lifetime utility maximized conditionally on c and t is denoted
by v (c;t), where v (:) is an indirect utility function, increasing and con-
cave. Since c may include the services of professional child minders,
concavity implies that bought-in child care is an imperfect substitute for
parental attention.
Assuming that the partners are altruistic towards their children, the
utility of partner i may be written as
Ui = u(ai1) + u(ai2) + ￿nv (c;t); 0 < ￿ < 1; (2)
where (a1
i;a2
i) is i￿ s own consumption stream, and u(:) the instantaneous
utility function, increasing and concave. Following Becker (1981), we will
refer to n as the quantity, and v (c;t) as the quality of children. Since
the nv (c; t) term is common to f￿ s and m￿ s utility, quantity and quality
are local public goods. As children are not di⁄erentiated by sex, and ￿
is the same for both partners, we are in e⁄ect saying that parents love
daughters as much as sons, and that fathers love children as much as
mothers do. As leisure does not ￿gure in (2), i will throw any time that
is left over from child care inelastically on to the labour market.
The last of these assumptions allows us to focus on the allocation
of total work time between market and domestic (identi￿ed, here, with
child care) activities.2 Normalizing to unity a person￿ s total work time
at each date, f￿ s and m￿ s date-1 labour supplies will be, respectively,
Lf = 1 ￿ (t0 + tf)n (3)
1How short depends on legislation and school of pediatric thought (from as little
as three months, to as much as three years).
2The assumption that a person￿ s total ￿market plus domestic ￿work time is a
constant has some empirical justi￿cation. Burda et al. (2006) ￿nd that this total
varies across countries (notably, between Europe and the US), but not across house-
holds belonging to the same country. What varies, within a country, is only the
allocation of total work time between the two types of work.
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= ￿(t0 + tf) < 0;
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@tf




= ￿tm ￿ 0;
@Lm
@tm
= ￿n ￿ 0: (6)
Since Li cannot be negative, (n;tf;tm) must be such that
(t0 + tf)n ￿ 1
and
ntm ￿ 1:
We assume that neither of these restrictions will be binding (i.e., that the
opportunity-cost of looking after children is su¢ ciently high for neither
parent to want to spend more than the whole of his or her total work
time in this activity). At date-2, when the children no longer demand
attention, the labour supply will be equal to unity for both partners.
When the union is formed, i is endowed with bi units of a trade-
able asset ("money"), and hi units of human capital. The latter may
be partly a re￿ ection of natural talent, and partly the result of previ-
ous educational investments or labour experience. From the moment
the union is formed, however, human capital increases only with labour
experience. We will assume that it accumulates at the rate ￿hi, where ￿
is a positive constant, per unit of labour. This formulation implies that
more talented, or better educated, workers learn from experience more,
or more quickly, than less talented, or less well educated ones. Nothing
of substance changes if we allow f and m to di⁄er also in their ability to
raise children, or assume that this ability also increases with experience.
In the light of these assumptions, i￿ s wage rate will be
w
1 (hi;Li) = (1 + ￿hiLi)hi
at date 1, and
w
2 (hi;Li) = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿hiLi)hi
at date 2. The assumption that the wage rate increases with market work
implies increasing returns to this activity. The assumption that a unit
of female human capital attracts the same rent (normalized to unity)
as a unit of male human capital, and that the wage rate of two equally
5endowed persons grows at the same rate per unit of labour irrespective
of sex, implies absence of gender discrimination in the labour market.
Partner i earns
y
1 (hi;Li) ￿ w
1 (hi;Li)Li (7)
at date 1, and
y
2 (hi;Li) ￿ w
2 (hi;Li) (8)
at date 2. Notice that not only date-1, but also date-2 earnings are
completely determined by the time allocation chosen at date 1, and that
both y1 (hi;Li) and y2 (hi;Li) are increasing in Li. The consequences of
relaxing some of the assumptions made in this section will be examined
at the end of the next one.
3 E¢ ciency
A Pareto-optimal (ai1;ai2;ti;c;n;s) maximizes
￿ = ￿Uf + (1 ￿ ￿)Um; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; (9)






i ￿ bi ￿ y
1 (hi;Li)
￿









￿ sr = 0 (11)
and
￿2￿ ￿ s; i = f;m; (12)
where s denotes the couple￿ s joint savings, r the interest factor, and ￿
the most that an individual is allowed to borrow. The parameter ￿ may
be interpreted as f￿ s domestic welfare weight.
As Ui is independent of ti, we can carry out the optimization in two
steps. First, we ￿nd the (tf;tm) which minimizes the opportunity-cost of
a child for each possible (n;t). Second, we look for the (ai1;ai2;t;c;n;s)
which maximizes ￿ for each possible ￿. The ￿rst step is equivalent to











subject to (1)￿(8), for a given (n;t). The solution is illustrated in Figure
1. The straight line with absolute slope equal to unity is an isoquant.
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                                     Figure 1.  Efficient division of labour diminishing as tm is substituted for tf, are isocosts. Convexity implies





(1 + 2￿)r + ￿(1 + ￿)
(1 + 2￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t)n])r + ￿(1 + ￿)
; (14)
the opportunity-cost of a child will be minimized by the traditional di-
vision of labour,
tf = t; tm = 0: (15)
Otherwise, it will be minimized by the liberated division of labour,
tf = 0; tm = t (16)
(but remember that a mother cannot specialize in market work as far as
a father, because she must spend at least t0 units of her time with each
child). Given a random distribution of human capital endowments, the
cost-minimizing division of labour is more likely to be the traditional
than the liberated one, because (14) is less stringent than its negation.
Condition (14) tells us that, unless hf is su¢ ciently larger than hm,
wealth is maximized if f takes on the role of main childcarer, and m
that of main earner. Conversely, if hf is su¢ ciently larger than hm to
satisfy (14), f should be in the role the main earner, and m in that of
main childcarer. In view of (7)￿(8), i￿ s date-1 and date-2 earnings will
be higher if i is the main earner, than if i is the main childcarer.





































































where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier of (11), necessarily positive at an
optimum, and ￿ that of (12), positive or zero according to whether the
constraint is or is not binding.


























otherwise. Since ￿ does not ￿gure in either (14) or (17)￿(20), it is clear
that, at a Pareto optimum, (Uf;Um) is separable from (s;n;c;tf;tm).
At an optimum, the parents will then equalize their MRS of present
for future consumption, and equated their MRS of quantity for quality
of children to the full cost of having an extra child. Similarly, they will
equate their children￿ s MRS of c for t to the opportunity-cost of giving
each child an extra unit of attention. If the couple is credit rationed,
however, the common value of the two MRSs of present for future con-
sumption will be higher than the interest factor, and the full marginal
costs of n and c will be lower than they would if future costs were dis-
counted at the interest factor. The solution will then be only a "local"
Pareto optimum (in the sense that the economy formed by f and m will
be a Pareto optimum conditional on what happens in the wider economy
in which it is immersed, but the latter is not a Pareto optimum).3
Proposition 1. E¢ ciency requires division of labour. If the
woman￿ s human capital endowment is su¢ ciently larger than
the man￿ s, the e¢ cient allocation will be characterized by the
liberated division of labour. Otherwise, it will be character-
ized by the traditional division of labour. Either party will
earn more if it specializes in market, than if it specializes in
domestic work.
Given a random distribution of endowments, this implies the follow-
ing.
Corollary 1. The traditional division of labour is more likely
to be e¢ cient than the liberated one.
Let us now look at the e⁄ects of relaxing some of our assumptions.
If we replace the one that tf and tm are perfect substitutes with the one
that tm substitutes for tf at a diminishing marginal rate, the isoquants
3That is the sense in which the expression "Pareto e¢ ciency" is generally used in
game theory.
8become convex to the origin, and the cost-minimizing time-mix may
then be at an interior point.4 If that were the case, there would be
less specialization than with perfect substitutability, but there would
still be some. Allowing for the possibility that not only the ability to
make money, but also the ability to bring up children increases with
experience will only make it more likely that the e¢ cient time allocation
is at a corner. We have remarked that the cost-minimizing allocation is
more likely to be characterized by the traditional, than by the liberated
division of labour. Dropping the (realistic) assumption that t0 is positive
(i.e., that the father cannot substitute for the mother at least over the
peri-natal period) would do away with this proposition, but would not
a⁄ect any of the other e¢ ciency properties. Allowing for the possibility
that the labour market discriminates against women, either in the sense
that hf is remunerated at a lower rate than hm (less pay for same work
and ability), or in the sense that wf grows with labour experience at
a rate lower than ￿ (restricted career opportunities for women), would
make it likely that the cost-minimizing allocation is the traditional one
even if t0 is zero, and even more if t0 is positive.5 Realistically allowing
for mutual a⁄ection between the parties makes no qualitative di⁄erence
to the results so long as each party loves itself at least a little more than
the other.
4 Equilibrium without marriage
Developing an idea in Becker (1981), Lam (1988) demonstrates the exis-
tence and stability of matching equilibria characterized by either positive
or negative assortative mating on wage rates and conventional assets. In
the more recent literature, the assumption is generally that partners are
matched by wealth. Indeed, Peters and Siow (2002) demonstrate the
existence and stability of wealth-matching equilibria. In our context,
however, i￿ s realized wealth,





is endogenous because it depends on time allocation. What is exogenous
is i￿ s potential or "full" wealth,
W
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4But not necessarily. If the elasticity of substitution of tm for tf is ￿nite but
greater than unity, the isoquants will still cut the axes, and the cost-minimizing
division of labour may still be at a corner.
5In the presence of discrimination, the allocation could only be a local Pareto
optimum even if the couple were not e⁄ectively rationed in the credit market.




F; i = f;m: (24)
That leaves room for either positive or negative assortment over money
and human capital endowments, but rules out the possibility that a
party is superior to the other on all scores (therefore, positive assortment
implies same endowments). It carries also the implication that, had they
remained single, f and m would have had the same utility level,
max
si
u(bi + (1 + ￿)hi ￿ si) + u
￿




S; i = f;m:
We take the couple￿ s initial endowments as given. A number of au-
thors, including Konrad and Lommerud (2000), Peters and Siow (2002),
and Cigno (2007), endogenize these endowments by modelling education
and other forms of investment before the union is formed. As the focus
of the present paper is on what happens after the union is formed, how-
ever, we will avoid complicating the model with restrictions other than
(24).
4.1 Non-cooperation
Suppose that f and m play Cournot-Nash. Let si denote i￿ s saving. Let
ci denote the amount of money, and ti the amount of time that i spends
on each child, so that
c = cf + cm
and
t = tf + tm:
The woman chooses (cf;sf;tf;n) to maximize
Uf = u(af1) + u(af2) + ￿nv (cf + cm; tf + tm);
subject to the individual budget constraints
af1 + ncf + sf = bf + y
1 (hf;Lf) (25)
and
af2 = rsf + y
2 (hf;Lf); (26)
and to the individual borrowing constraint
￿￿ ￿ sf; (27)
taking (cm;tm) as given.
10The ￿rst-order conditions yield
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where the derivatives of Lf are given by (5), ￿f is the Lagrange-multiplier
of (26), and ￿f that of (27).
The man chooses (cm;sm;tm) to maximize
Um = u(am1) + u(am2) + ￿nv (cf + cm; tf + tm);
subject to
am1 + ncm + sm = (1 ￿ ntm)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ ntm)]hm; (32)
am2 = rsm + [1 + ￿(1 ￿ ntm)]hm (33)
and
￿￿ ￿ sm; (34)
taking (cf;tf;n) as given.
The ￿rst-order conditions yield
u








vt (cf + cm; tf + tm)
















where the derivatives of Lm are given by (6), ￿m is the Lagrange-
multiplier of (33), and ￿m that of (34).
Let a C superscript denote the value of a variable at the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. Then, using (28)￿(30) and (35)￿(37), we can write
ai1 = a
C
1 ; ai2 = a
C
2 ; ci = c
C; ￿i = ￿
C and ￿i = ￿
C:
11Therefore, the partners will have the same utility level, UC. As the
































r￿C + ￿C￿(1 + ￿)
￿
hm:
If hf is equal to hm (positive assortment), f and m will then split child
















If hf is di⁄erent from hm (negative assortment), the monetary cost of
children will still be split equally between the parties, but the parent with
the larger human capital endowment will supply more child care, and
less market work, than the parent with the larger money endowment. In
other words, the two will specialize against their comparative advantages
in order to equalize their incomes. The opportunity-cost of parental
attention will not be minimized in either case, because the parents will
not specialize in accordance with their comparative advantages.6
If credit is not rationed at equilibrium, saving will not be distorted.
As (30) and (37) have the same LHS, the RHSs will be equal too. Given
that time is ine¢ ciently allocated, however, the sum of the RHSs of
(30) and (37) will be larger than the RHS of (18) for any positive n.
In equilibrium, therefore, each child will receive less attention, and rel-
atively more money, than would be e¢ cient. Inspecting (31), we also
notice that the RHS of this equation is not the marginal cost of n to the
couple, but only f￿ s share of it. As the marginal cost to the couple is
6Remember that, if the parents have the same human capital endowments, the
mother a comparative advantage in child care, and the father in market work, for
any positive value of t0.
12ine¢ ciently large, f￿ s share of it need not, but is likely to, be smaller
than the e¢ cient total. Therefore, n is likely to be ine¢ ciently large. If
the mother is credit rationed (￿f positive), that will reduce the RHS of
(31), and thus make it even more likely that n will be ine¢ ciently large.
Proposition 2. A Cournot-Nash equilibrium equalizes the in-
come and utility levels of the parties to a non-marital union,
but is not a Pareto optimum, not even a local one, because the
parties do not exploit their comparative advantages, and the
mother free-rides on the father over the choice of the num-
ber of children. If the parents have the same endowments,
they will take equal shares in both market and domestic work;
otherwise, they will specialize against their comparative ad-
vantages. Child quality will be ine¢ ciently low, because the
couple spends too little time, and relatively too much money,
on each child. Child quantity is likely to be ine¢ ciently large,
especially if the mother is credit rationed.
We have already remarked that it would make no sense for the couple
to separate at date 1. If the couple plays Cournot-Nash, it will make no
sense for two to separate at date 2 either, because that would make no
di⁄erence to their utility.
4.2 Cooperation
Alternatively, suppose that f and m play a Nash-bargaining game. The
two have a common interest in minimizing the opportunity-cost of chil-
dren, and coordinating their decisions regarding the quality and quantity
of the same. As cost minimization requires specialization, however, the
candidate for the main childcarer role will agree to cooperate only if the
candidate for the main earner role makes the former an adequate trans-
fer at date 1, or credibly promises to make one at date 2. The problem
with the latter is that, when date 2 comes, there will be no more e¢ -
ciency gains to be reaped by cooperation, and it will then be in the main
earner￿ s interest to renege on the promise. Therefore, the promise will
be credible if and only if it is the object a contract enforceable through
a civil court. If the associated transactions-cost is prohibitively high
however, the promise will not be credible, and any transfer will have to
be made, in full, at date 1.
If the state of the world at date 2 were uncertain, the equilibrium
would have to be found by backward induction. In our framework, how-
ever, there is no uncertainty, and an unmarried couple will play Nash-
bargaining if and only if the main earner can buy the main childcarer￿ s
cooperation either with a payment at date 1, or with a legally binding
13promise to make a one at date 2. If a Nash-bargaining equilibrium exists,
it is then found in one shot by maximizing
N = (Uf ￿ Rf)(Um ￿ Rm); (39)
where Ri denotes i￿ s reserve utility, subject to the utility-possibility fron-
tier (UPF),
F (Uf;Um) ￿ 0: (40)
In many household economics applications of game theory, Ri is iden-
ti￿ed with i￿ s utility if he or she remained single. In Lundberg and Pol-
lak (1996) and many other papers in its wake, Ri is identi￿ed with i￿ s
equilibrium utility in the Cournot-Nash game that the couple could have
plaid instead of Nash-bargaining. In our context, both these alternatives
cease to be available the moment the children are born, and resources
are allocated to them, because that will irrevocably modify the initial
endowments. As the couple will play Nash-bargaining if and only if the
prospective main earner can either compensate the main childcarer at
date 1, or commit to do so at date 2 by signing a legally binding con-







the threat-point of that game. As US cannot be larger than UC for the
assumption that f and m have formed a union, we can then simply write
Ri = U
C; i = f;m:
The utility-possibility frontier is traced maximizing (9), for each pos-
sible value of ￿, subject to (2) ￿ (8), (27),(34),
af1 + cn + sf = bf + y
1 (hf;Lf) + z1; (41)
am1 + z1 + sm = bm + y
1 (hm;Lm) (42)
af2 = sfr + y
2 (hf;Lf) + z2; (43)
and
am2 + z2 = smr + y
2 (hm;Lm); (44)
where zd is a voluntary transfer from m to f at date d = 1;2, nonnegative
if m is the main earner, non-positive if f is. We have conventionally
assigned the monetary cost of the children, cn, entirely to the mother.
If z1 is positive, however, part of this cost will be e⁄ectively borne by
the father. As already explained, z2 can be di⁄erent from zero only if
the main earner can commit to making this transfer.




































































where ￿i and ￿i have the same interpretation as in the last subsection.
If z2 is di⁄erent from zero, ￿f is equal to ￿m, and ￿f to ￿m. At the
cost-minimizing division of labour, the ￿rst derivatives of Li are given
by (22) if (14) is satis￿ed, by (23) if it is not.
If neither of the borrowing constraints is binding, ￿f and ￿m are
equal to zero, and (45)￿(48) is then equivalent to (17)￿(20). If that is
true everywhere, the UPF coincides with the e¢ ciency locus. A Nash-
bargaining equilibrium then exists, and is e¢ cient. Furthermore, as the
e¢ ciency locus is symmetrical around the 45￿ line, the equilibrium the
will give the same utility level to each partner. This case is illustrated
in Figure 2, where j stands for main childcarer, and k for main earner,
j;k = f;m. The continuous concave-to-the-origin curve is the graph of
the e¢ ciency locus. The convex-to-the-origin ones are contours of (9).
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is represented by point C, and the Nash-
bargaining equilibrium by point B. Both these points lie on the 45￿ line,
but C is inside, and B actually on, the e¢ ciency locus.
Alternatively, suppose that, everywhere except at Uj = 0,








The UPF then looks like the dashed concave-to-the-origin curve of Figure
2. As this curve is steeper than the continuous one representing the e¢ -
ciency locus because k￿ s credit ration gets tighter as z1 gets larger (more
positive for k = m, or more negative for k = f ), a Nash-bargaining
equilibrium may not exist. In the illustrative example, it does and is
represented by the point B￿ , inside the e¢ ciency locus, and above the
45￿ line. Therefore, the equilibrium gives the main childcarer less utility












                                                
 
  
                                                                          B 
                                                    B’          B”   
                                                                              
                                                               
                                                     
  
 
                                           
 
                              C 





                 45°  
        O                                                                                                                                            Uj 
                                       
Figure 2.  Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and Nash-bargaining equilibrium with and 
without separate-property marriage. In view of Proposition 1, ￿j will always be smaller than ￿k if the cost-
minimizing division of labour is the liberated one, because f can qualify
for the main earner￿ s role only if (hf ￿ hm) is positive, and (bf ￿ bm)
consequently negative. That may not be the case, however, if the division
of labour is the traditional one, because (hf ￿ hm) does not need to be
negative. Furthermore, if the cost-minimizing division of labour is the
traditional one, @Lm
@t and @Lm
@n will be zero in view of (22), and the quality
and quantity of children will not be distorted. If the division of labour
is the liberated one, by contrast, @Lm
@t and @Lm
@n will be negative in view
of (23), and the quality and quantity of children will then be distorted.
Therefore, if the main earner is the woman, the UPF will look like the
dashed curve in Figure 2. If the main earner is the man, the UPF will lie
inside the e¢ ciency locus at all values of Uj, but will not be necessarily
steeper than it.
Proposition 3. In the absence of credit rationing, an unmar-
ried couple will play Nash-bargaining. The resulting equilib-
rium will be e¢ cient, and will equalize the utility levels of
the two parties. In the presence of credit rationing, a Nash-
bargaining equilibrium may not exist. If it does, it will be
ine¢ cient, and may (will if the division of labour is the lib-
erated one) give higher utility to the main earner than to the
main childcarer.
5 Marriage
Let us now introduce the marriage institution. A marital union di⁄ers
from a non-marital one in that (i) it cannot be dissolved without court
permission, and (ii) a court may order one party to make the other a
transfer in the event of dissolution ("divorce"). Having argued that nei-
ther party can have an interest in separating at date 1, divorce can take
place only at date 2, when the children are out of the way. Therefore,
a mandatory transfer cannot be construed as child maintenance.7 In
our perfect-information framework, there is also no room for divorce on
grounds of adultery, mental or physical cruelty, and the like. There-
fore, a mandatory transfer cannot be construed as compensation for the
o⁄ended party. If an award is made, it can only be on distributional
grounds.
7As already pointed out, our perfect-information model cannot explain separation
while the children are still dependent on their parents. For an economic analysis of
the e⁄ects of child-support orders in an imperfect information setting, see Del Boca
and Flinn (1995).
16A couple will marry if neither party would be better-o⁄ cohabiting.
If a party is indi⁄erent between marrying and cohabiting, it will spin a
coin. In the present section, we show how the decision to marry, and
the properties of the domestic equilibrium conditional on marriage, are
a⁄ected by divorce policy, and by the matrimonial property regime, un-
der the assumption that cohabitation without marriage attracts neither
social stigma, nor legal discrimination.
5.1 Separate property
In a separate-property8 jurisdiction, any income or assets a spouse gen-
erates or acquires in the course of marriage are that spouse￿ s individual
property. As in the last section, the budget constraints are (25) ￿ (26)
and (32) ￿ (33) if the couple plays Cournot-Nash, (41) ￿ (44) if it plays
Nash-bargaining. In the second case, however, it may now be in the
main earner￿ s interest to make the other a transfer at date 2. If it is,
the main earner￿ s promise to do so may will be credible even without
a legally binding contract. The borrowing constraints remain (27) and
(34).
Let ￿ be the exogenously given cost (necessarily nonnegative) of ob-
taining a divorce, and ￿ the alimony (positive, negative or zero) awarded
to f in that event.9 Each spouse￿ s date-2 consumption must now be at
least as large staying married as divorcing,
sfr + y
2 (hf;Lf) + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ af2 (50)
and
smr + y
2 (hm;Lm) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ am2: (51)
We will refer to (50) as f￿ s, and (51) as m￿ s, divorce-threat constraint.
At most one of these restrictions will be binding. If f￿ s is, z2 will be
positive and equal to (￿ ￿ ￿). If m￿ s is, z2 will be negative and equal to
(￿ + ￿). Notice that ￿ relaxes both these constraints, and thus makes it
less likely that either of them will be binding.
We consider only two possibilities. In the ￿rst, the divorce courts
have an egalitarian stance, ￿ takes the sign of (Um ￿ Uf). In the other,
the courts have a neutral stance, and ￿ is identically zero. The possibility
that the courts will deliberately set out to increase inequality between
the former spouses seems too perverse to merit attention, and is ruled
8Common-law in the US.
9Alimony may be paid at regular intervals, or all at once. In our simpli￿ed time-
frame, however, there is no way of distinguishing between a lump-sum payment at
date 2, and a stream of periodical payments with present value equal to that sum
from date 2 onwards.
17out by law in some legal systems. If the couple plays Cournot-Nash,
the partners will have the same equilibrium utility, and ￿ will then be
equal to zero whatever the court￿ s stance. We will consequently restrict
our attention to the case, the only one in which marriage can make a
di⁄erence, where the couple plays Nash-bargaining, and the courts have
an egalitarian stance.
The utility-possibility frontier of a married couple is traced maxi-
mizing (9), for all possible values of ￿, subject to (2) ￿ (8), (27), (34),





































































where ￿i is the Lagrange-multiplier of i￿ s divorce-threat constraint, and
the other variables are de￿ned as in the last section. The higher is ￿, the
less likely it is that i￿ s divorce-threat constraint will be binding, and the
lower the value of ￿i if it is binding. The threat-point is again (Rf;Rm),
but Ri is now the larger of i￿ s utility in the Nash-bargaining equilibrium
without marriage, and i￿ s utility in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As
the latter is independent of the couple￿ s marital status, the way mar-
riage and court policy can then a⁄ect the Nash-bargaining equilibrium
conditional on marriage, and the decision to marry, is not through the
threat-point, but by deforming the utility-possibility frontier.
If neither (50) nor (51) is binding, ￿f and ￿m will be zero, and (52)￿
(55) will reduce to (45) ￿ (48). As the UPF will then coincide with the
e¢ ciency locus, a Nash-bargaining equilibrium will exist, and will be the
same as if the couple were not married. If that is the case, the couple
will decide whether to marry or cohabit by spinning a coin. By contrast,
if either (50) or (51) is binding, ￿f or ￿m will be positive, z2 will be
di⁄erent from zero even without a legally binding contract, and ￿f will
be equal to ￿m. How will that a⁄ect the couple￿ s choices?
18As only the main childcarer￿ s divorce-threat constraint can be bind-













where ￿ is the common value of ￿j and ￿k. With or without an operative
threat, if
0 = ￿j < ￿k;
j￿ s intertemporal trade-o⁄will be lower than k￿ s. With the threat, how-
ever, the di⁄erence between the two will be smaller (it cannot change
sign, because ￿ and, consequently, ￿j go to zero the moment the two
trade-o⁄s are equated) than without the threat. In Figure 2, the UPF
associated with a positive ￿j is represented by the dot-and-dash curve.
This is steeper than the continuous one representing the e¢ ciency locus,
but not as steep as the dashed one representing the UPF with ￿j equal
to zero. An operative divorce threat then makes it more likely that a
Nash-bargaining equilibrium will exist. If such an equilibrium would ex-
ist anyway, it will be less unfavorable to j with than without the threat
(i.e., with than without marriage). In the illustrative example, the equi-
librium with the operative threat exists, and is represented by the point
B", closer to the e¢ ciency locus, and to the 45￿ line, than the point B￿
representing the equilibrium without the threat.
Proposition 4. In a separate-property jurisdiction, marriage
can make a di⁄erence to the domestic equilibrium only if
credit is rationed, and the divorce courts use alimony to re-
duce utility inequality between the former spouses. If that is
the case, marriage makes it more likely that a Nash-bargaining
equilibrium will exist. If the equilibrium would have existed
anyway, it will be less ine¢ cient, and less unfavorable to the
main childcarer, with than without marriage. The lower is
the cost of obtaining a divorce, the larger is the e⁄ect of mar-
riage.
5.2 Community property
In a community-property jurisdiction, any income produced or assets
acquired in the course of marriage are the couple￿ s joint property. As a
result, the couple faces the joint date-1 and date-2 budget constraints
(10) and (11), instead of the individual ones associated with cohabita-
tion, or separate-property marriage. For the same reason, the couple
faces the joint borrowing constraint (12) instead of the more individual
19ones. In such a legal framework, there is no possibility of a monetary
transfer between the spouses. By ruling out the possibility of a Cournot-
Nash game, this makes sure that the spouses will play Nash-bargaining.
By preventing k from buying j￿ s cooperation (either with a payment at
date 1, or with a legally binding promise to make one at date 2) once
the wedding has taken place, however, it rules out also the possibility of
a Nash-bargaining equilibrium without an operative divorce threat.
In the event of divorce, a court will be called upon to share the
community property,
p ￿ (s ￿ bf ￿ bm)r;
between the former spouses in some way. Some legislations prescribe
equal shares, others give the courts some leeway over the matter (which
the courts typically use to compensate the main childcarer).10 We can
then write f￿ s divorce-threat constraint as
bfr + y
2 (hf;Lf) + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ af2; (58)
and m￿ s as
bmr + y
2 (hm;Lm) + p ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ am2: (59)
As in a separate-property regime, ￿ relaxes both these constraints. If
we de￿ne ￿ to include not only the share of the community property
assigned to f, but also a transfer from m to f out of the former￿ s own
pre-marital assets and post-divorce earnings, and assume that ￿ is set
larger or smaller than
p
2 according to whether Um is larger or smaller
than Uf, only the main childcarer￿ s can be binding. In every other case,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the main earner￿ s divorce-threat
constraint will be binding instead.
The utility-possibility frontier is now traced by maximizing (9), for
each possible ￿, subject to (10) ￿ (12) and (58) ￿ (59). Therefore, at





































10In the US, a state prescribing equal shares is labelled community-property,

































where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier of the couple￿ s joint date-2 budget
constraint, ￿ that of their joint borrowing constraint, and ￿i that of i￿ s
divorce-threat constraint. The threat-point is the same as in a separate-
property regime.
As a married couple has no alternative but to play Nash-bargaining,
f and m will marry only if the prospective main childcarer￿ s divorce-













Figure 3 illustrates the case where ￿j is positive for all Uj lower than Uk.
As the UPF then looks like the dot-and-dash curve, the equilibrium is
at point B.
Proposition 5. In a community-property jurisdiction, a mar-
ried couple can only play Nash-bargaining. If divorce legisla-
tion and sentencing practice are such that only the prospec-
tive main childcarer can credibly threaten divorce, the couple
will marry. The equilibrium will then be e¢ cient, and give
the same utility level to both spouses. Otherwise, a Nash-
bargaining equilibrium conditional on marriage may not ex-
ist. The lower is the cost of obtaining a divorce, the more
likely it is that the couple will marry.
6 Discussion
Given increasing returns to market work experience, domestic division
of labour according to the couple￿ s comparative advantages minimizes
the cost of bringing up children. That remains true if there are also
increasing returns to domestic (child care) work. The cost-minimizing
division of labour may be either traditional (father specializes in market
work, mother looks after the children), or liberated (mother goes back
to her job as soon as possible after the children are born, leaving father
to look after them). If, at least over the peri-natal period, the mother
cannot be replaced by the father, a man can qualify for the main earner￿ s
role even if, when the union is formed, his human capital endowment is
21 
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Figure 3.  Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and Nash-bargaining equilibrium with and 
without community-property marriage. no higher than the woman￿ s. This makes it more likely that the cost-
minimizing division of labour will be the traditional one ￿and even more
so if the labour market discriminates against women in some way.
If the parties to a union play Cournot-Nash, they will either not
specialize at all, or specialize against their comparative advantages so
as to equalize earnings. Furthermore, the mother (assumed to have ul-
timate control over her fertility) will free-ride on the father over the
choice of number of children. At equilibrium, each child will be raised
with relatively too much money, and too little parental attention, and
the quality/quantity of children mix will be wrong too. Therefore, a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is always ine¢ cient, but gives the same util-
ity level to each party. Division of labour in accordance with comparative
advantages will be forthcoming if the parties play Nash-bargaining. But
the equilibrium may be ine¢ cient all the same, because the couple￿ s in-
tertemporal consumption plans may be distorted by credit rationing or,
if the couple is married under a separate-property regime, by the threat
of divorce. If the equilibrium is ine¢ cient, it may be also unfair to the
main childcarer. The ￿nding that the domestic allocation of resources
may be ine¢ cient even if the couple cooperates casts doubt on the empir-
ical literature inspired by the collective model of household decisions,11
which seeks to recover the domestic sharing rule from the observation
of activities or items of consumption unambiguously attributable to ei-
ther one or the other partner, under the assumption that the domestic
allocation of resources will always be e¢ cient.
As the main childcarer earns less than the main earner, neither party
to a union will agree to be the former unless it is guaranteed adequate
compensation by the latter. Such compensation may be delivered con-
textually with fertility and time-allocation decisions, or at a later date
when the children are grown-up and out of the way. At that date, how-
ever, there will be no more e¢ ciency gains to be had by division of
labour. As the birth of children and the allocation of parental time
to their upbringing irreversibly modi￿es the couple￿ s human capital en-
dowments, any promise to deliver compensation to the main childcarer
at that later date will not be credible unless it is in the main earner￿ s
interest to honour it. The decision whether to marry or cohabit, the
choice of game conditional on marital status, and the division of labour
if the game is cooperative, are endogenous. If marriage legislation and
divorce court practice are such that the main childcarer can credibly
threaten divorce, marriage may serve as commitment device which will
make it less costly for the prospective main earner to secure the prospec-
tive main childcarer￿ s cooperation. In a separate-property jurisdiction, a
11See Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994) for an overview.
22married couple may play either Cournot-Nash or Nash-Bargaining. Mar-
riage can a⁄ect the choice of game, and the ensuing equilibrium in the
case of Nash-bargaining, only if credit is rationed. If a Nash-bargaining
equilibrium would exist whatever the couple￿ s marital status, it will be
less ine¢ cient, and treat the main childcarer less unfavorably, with than
without marriage. In a community-property jurisdiction, by contrast,
a married couple can play only Nash-bargaining. The equilibrium will
be e¢ cient, and assign the same utility level to both spouses. In either
marriage property regime, the lower is the cost of obtaining a divorce,
the more likely it is that a couple will marry.
Although a perfect-information model like the present one cannot ex-
plain the real world, it is nonetheless interesting to compare the model￿ s
theoretical predictions with the empirical evidence. Bureau of Labor
(2004), Drago et al. (2004), and Stancanelli (2007) report that, while
the majority of women do not earn more than their male partners, a
substantial minority of them (up to one in ￿ve) in the US, Australia and
France does. In the light of substantial equality of opportunity for men
and women in the labour markets of these countries, this ￿nding is con-
sistent with the model￿ s prediction that the liberated division of labour
is less likely than the traditional one, but still a possibility ￿especially
if the labour market does not discriminate against women.
In the developed part of the world, cohabitation without marriage
is socially acceptable at least since the 1960s, and the legislative trend
is towards giving unmarried couples the same rights as married ones
in matters such as tax treatment, inheritance, adoption, housing tenure,
recognition of the partner as next of kin (e.g., if the other is hospitalized),
and so on. Any residual form of legal discrimination has disappeared, in
several European countries, with the introduction of legislation enabling
de-facto couples to acquire the same legal rights as married ones by sim-
ply recording their union in a public register.12 Evidence, in Stevenson
and Wolfers (2007) and elsewhere, that marriage is losing ground to
cohabitation in developed countries may thus be interpreted as show-
ing that, more and more, a couple marries only if that makes it easier
reaching a cooperative agreement.
Since the 1970s, many developed countries have introduced unilat-
eral divorce legislation which e⁄ectively entitles either spouse to end a
12The name given to these partnerships varies from country to country (civil part-
nership in the UK, pact civil de solidaritØ et du concubinage in France, Eingetragene
Lebenspartnerschaft in Germany, etc.), but the substance is the same. A couple can
costlessly record its union, and either party can costlessly and unilaterally rescind
it at any moment. This possibility is open to both homosexual and heterosexual
couples, but is not to be confused with homosexual, which is no di⁄erent from het-
erosexual marriage where the cost of obtaining a divorce is concerned.
23marriage by simply saying so before a court. This reduces the cost of
obtaining a divorce, because the petitioner does not need to expend re-
sources gathering or fabricating evidence of cruelty or adultery on the
respondent￿ s part. The evidence regarding the e⁄ects of these legislative
changes is controversial. Zelder (1993) and Friedberg (1997) estimate
that the introduction of divorce on demand by several US states en-
couraged divorce, but Smith (1997) ￿nds that it had none in the UK.
The two US studies do not control for matrimonial property legislation,
and the UK one refers to variations over time in a single country where
this legislation was the same throughout the sample period. Control-
ling for property legislation, Gray (1998) ￿nds that the introduction
of unilateral divorce in the US did not encourage divorce, but encour-
aged married women to supply more labour in separate-property states.
Stevenson (2008) disputes the dependence of the labour e⁄ects of divorce
legislation on the property regime, and attributes Gray￿ s ￿nding to an
omitted-variable problem. In our model, the cost of obtaining a divorce
cannot a⁄ect the likelihood of divorce because, in equilibrium, there is no
divorce. By strengthening the role of marriage as a commitment device,
however, a reduction in this cost makes it more likely that a couple will
play Nash-bargaining rather than Cournot-Nash. These theoretical pre-
dictions are consistent with the empirical ￿nding that the introduction
of unilateral divorce did not cause the divorce rate to increase as some
feared. They are consistent also with estimates of a positive e⁄ect of
unilateral divorce on married women￿ s labour supply if, for a su¢ ciently
large proportion of the couples switching from Cournot-Nash to Nash-
bargaining as a result of this legislative innovation, the cost-minimizing
division of labour was the liberated one.
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